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NOTE
Summary Proceedings in Direct
Contempt Cases
While I was busy for the common wealth,
Your highness pleased to forget my place,
The power and majesty of the law and justice,
The image of the king whom I presented,
And struck me in my very seat of judgement,
Whereon, as an offender to your father,
I gave bold way to my authority,
And did commit you .... *
Henry IV, part ii, act v, scene 2
I. INTODUCflON

That the "power and majesty" of the law, personified by the court and
its decrees, could not be lightly brushed aside even by a prince was a
settled fact by the time of Shakespeare; it remains so today. But the
proceedings by which such an offense may be punished is another matter.
At the present time a large number of contempts are disposed of by summary proceedings. It was not always so, and recently a number of highly respected judges and writers have begun to argue that the practice should
be discontinued. This revival of interest is the raison d'etre of this note; it
is devoted to considering the history, contemporary status, advantages and
disadvantages of summary proceedings in direct contempt cases.
*This excerpt is from Shakespeare's apocryphal sequel to the legendary tale of
Prince Henry of Monmouth's contempt of court. A servant of Prince Henry had been
brought before the court on a charge of felony. The prince, incensed with idea that a
court would dare to touch even a servant of his, charged into court and argued valiantly but vainly for the servant. Enraged at his futility, he culminated the argument
by striking (or so Shakespeare says) Chief-Justice Gascoign, who immediately committed him for contempt. In Shakespeare's sequel, Henry IV has died, and Prince
Henry ascends to the throne. The Chief-Justice, quaking with fear at the thought
that his previous contemnor is now the king, converses with Henry V. Henry V, however, seeing the necessity of the contempt power even as to a prince, thanks the ChiefJustice for his zeal and courage, and encourages him to commit any sons of his if they
have the audacity to tread the rebellious path of their father. Although some hold the
story to be true Mr. Solly-Flood has effectively demolished the authenticity of this
rather amusing historical anecdote. Solly-Flood, The Story of Prince Henry of Monmouth and Chief-Justice Gascoign, 3 TRANSACTIONS OF THE RoYAL HisToRIcAL Soc'y
(n.s.) 47 (1886). For another contempt by a famous historical personage, see Deutsch,
The United States Versus Andrew Jackson, 46 A.B.A.J. 966 (1960).
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Contempts of court are generally classified into the following groups:1
Civil Contempt.-This type of contemptuous act is the failure of a party
in a civil action to carry out a decree of the court made for the benefit of
the contemnor's opponent. The failure to obey the court's order is treated
as contempt primarily for the purpose of making available the court's
coercive power to the opposing party.
Criminal Contempt.-Such an act is generally the result of some active
disrespect of the court, whereas civil contempt usually involves only the
passive failure to obey the court. Criminal contempt is punished primarily
to vindicate the authority of the court, being punitive in nature.
This classification is concededly rather vague and overlapping, 2 and one
further distinction need be made between direct and indirect (also known
as "constructive" or "consequentiar') contempt. The former is contempt
committed "in the immediate view and presence of the court (such as
insulting language or acts of violence) or so near the presence of the court
as to obstruct or interrupt the due and orderly course of proceedings.' The
latter involves conduct not in the presence of or near the court, but which
nevertheless tends to obstruct or defeat the administration of justice (e.g.,
abusive criticism of the judge made outside the court room tending to
influence the result of a pending trial).
The term "summary proceedings" in its most restricted use involves the
idea of a proceeding without a jury. As used in this note the term has a
broader meaning: a proceeding which is "immediate, peremptory; offhand; without a jury; provisional."4
1. For a brief but excellent discussion of the various classifications of contempt,
He makes the point
that, while contempt may be simply defined as "disregard of the authority of the court,"
this or any other definition of the term is more or less meaningless unless the definition
be applied to the various acts which have been held to constitute contempt of court.
Id. at 1.
Fox says that "no better concise definition of 'contempt of court' can be found than
that given in the New English Dictionary: 'Any disobedience of the rules, orders or
process of a court, whether committed by an inferiour court, by the servants of the
court or officers of the law or by strangers, and any disrespect or indignity offered to
the judges in their judicial capacity within or without the court."' Fox, The Nature
of Contempt of Court, 37 L.Q. REv. 191-92 (1921). See the more extensive definition
of contempt of court which Fox cites with approval, id. at 192. Fox traces the term
"contempt of court" from the phrase "Contemptus Couriae," first used about the year
1187. Fox, The Practice in Contempt of Court Cases, 38 L.Q. REv. 185 (1922). See
generally Mosk, Direct Contempt, 31 CALIw. S.B.J. 510 (1956) for an ofttimes humorous discussion of the various elements of direct contempt.
2. For an excellent example of a situation where the classification of the various
contempts is difficult, see Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
See Green, Equity-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAND. L. REV. 1095, 1097-98 (1957).
3. BLACK, LAW DrcnoNARY (4th ed. 1951). Fox recounts an amusing case of direct
contempt by egg-throwing. Fox, The Practice in Contempt of Court Cases, 38 L.Q.
REv. 185-86 (1922).
4. BLACK, LAw DrcrONARY (4th ed. 1951). The United States Supreme Court
see THOMs, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 2-3 (1934).

NOTE
II.

HsToRY

A. England
For many years a number of English and American courts have justified
their use of the contempt power by referring to "immemorial usage."5 The
concept that contempt power was exercised in summary proceedings by the
earliest English courts was promulgated in this country in Blackstone,
which was widely read and accepted by judges and lawyers of the colonial
period. 6 Blackstone's statement was that summary proceedings had been
"immemorially used" to punish both direct and consequential contempts.
explained the term "summary" as used in FED. R. CnsLM. P. 42(a) as follows: "We
think 'summary' as used in this Rule does not refer to the timing of the action with
reference to the offense but refers to a procedure which dispenses with the formality,
delay and digression that would result from the issuance of process, service of complaint and answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to arguments, awaiting
briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes with a conventional court trial." Sacher
v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1952).
5. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 594 (1895); Pass v. State, 181 Tenn. 613, 617, 184
S.W.2d 1, 2 (1944); State v. Buddress, 63 Wash. 26, 114 Pac. 879, 881 (1911); State
ex rel. Radd v. Verage, 177 Wis. 295, 187 N.W. 830, 840 (1922). "[T]he right of
trial by jury . . . existed at common law, by immemorial usage, in harmony with the
power of the courts to punish for contempts by attachment, each applying to its appropriate class of cases ....
" State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384, 400 (1855).
6. "Blackstone was widely known to the colonials, so that even a misstatement by
him would shed light on the possible intent of the [Constitutional] Convention." Comment, 57 MICH. L. REv. 958, 261 (1958). "The meagreness of American law libraries
contributed, of course, to account for the almost Scriptual authority of Blackstone in
our early law." Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28
CoLum. L. REv. 401, 405 n.25 (1928). That this infatuation with Blackstone was not
unanimous is proposed by Warren, when he states that the older colonial lawyers
agreed with Lord Eldon's statement that "at present, lawyers are made good, cheap,
by learning law from Blackstone and less elegant compilers. Depend upon it, men so
bred will never be lawyers .....
WARREN, A HISToRY OF THE A,=MEcAN BAR 175
(1911).
7. 4 BLACKSTONE, CoiaflrrNTnxs *283-84. "To this head of summary proceedings
may also be properly referred the method, immemorially used by the superior courts of
justice, of punishing contempts by attachment, and the subsequent proceedings thereon.
The contempts that are thus punished are either direct, which openly insult or resist
the powers of the courts or the persons of the judges who preside there, or else are
consequential, which (without such gross insolence or direct opposition) plainly tend
to create a universal disregard of their authority." Blackstone goes on to say that for
contempts committed in the face of the court, the offender could be instantly apprehended and imprisoned. For other contempts, the judge, upon affidavit, either made a
rule on the suspected party to show cause or, in flagrant cases the court brought the
offender directly into court and put interrogatories to him. If the party could swear
on his oath that he was innocent, he was discharged. See Curtis, The Story of a Notion in the Law of Criminal Contempt, 41 HAnv. L. PREv. 51 (1927). If he lied, he
could be committed for perjury. If he confessed the acts, or refused to answer, the
court immediately sentenced him. 4 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. supra at *286-87. Blackstone,
though holding this procedure to be of "immemorial usage," gave a clue to his personal opinion, especially as to interrogatories, when he said that "this method of making
the defendant answer upon his oath to a criminal charge is not agreeable to the genius
of the common law in any other instance ....
" Id. at *287.
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While the basis for his statement has never been satisfactorily explained, a
convincing argument concerning Blackstone's sources has been advanced
by Sir John Fox in his scholarly and detailed articles on the history of
contempt of court in England. 8 Fox contends that Blackstone based his
statement on the opinion in Rex v. Almon,9 written by Justice Wilmot.
The case involved a libelous pamphlet written by Almon impugning the
judicial integrity and motives of Lord Maisfield, who had been dealing
rather sharply with the right of juries and the liberty of the press. 10 Wilmot, perhaps influenced by his friendship with Maisfield," wrote the
judgment in favor of granting the attachment against the libelor-contemnor, Almon. The following extract reveals the general tenor of the
decision:
The power which the Courts in Westminster Hall have of vindicating their own
authority is coeval with their first foundation and institution; it is a necessary
incident to every court of justice, whether of record or not, to fine and imprison
for a contempt to the court, acted in the face of it . . . and the issuing of
attachments by the supreme courts of justice in Westminster Hall for contempts
out of court stands upon the same immemorial usage as supports the whole fabric
of the common law .... 12

Because of a procedural delay, the case was continued until a new set of
ministers decided to drop the matter.
The judgment, written in 1765, was never delivered; it was, however,
published in 1802, ten years after Wilmot's death. Although this publication
occurred several years after Blackstone finished his work, the judgment was
nevertheless a very probable basis for his statements, since he had received
it in correspondence with his friend Wilmot. 13 Thus it has been said that
8. These articles, which will be cited and referred to frequently, have been accepted
by the experts as correctly expounding the true history of contempt of court in England,
especially as to summary procedure. For a variety of authors who have incorporated
Fox's articles into their own work, see ThoAs, PnOBLEMS OF CONTEMPT OF COUnT
8-9 (1934); Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempt in "Inferior' Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HAnv. L. REV.
1010, 1042-47 (1924); Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the United States,
28 COLUM. L. REv. 401, 408 (1928).
9. Wilmot's Notes 243 (1765) (undelivered opinion).
10. Fox, The King v. Almon, 24 L.Q. REv. 184, 187 (1908).
11. Ibid.
12. Excerpt from Rex v. Almon, Wilmot's Notes 243, 254 (1765), quoted in Fox,
supra note 10, at 185-86.
13. Although the fourth volume of Blackstone's Commentaries (in which his views
on summary proceedings in contempt cases are stated) was published in 1769, 33
years before Rex v. Almon appeared, Fox relates that Wilmot had written the decision
in 1765 and that Blackstone had submitted the proofs of part of this volume to Wilmot.
Fox, supra note 10, at 193 n.4. From this Fox concluded that Blackstone's statements
on summary procedure in contempt cases (see note 7 supra) were based on Rex v.
Almon.

NOTE
"the present scope of the summary power is due almost exclusively to the
opinion of one man."14
This opinion, however, was based on a questionable foundation, for, as
Wilmot himself said, "I have examined very carefully to see if I could
find out any vestiges or traces of its [summary proceeding's] introduction
but can find none."' 5 From this Wilmot draws the conclusion, apparently
a non sequitur, that such proceedings are "as ancient as any other part of
the common law."16 Fox takes issue with this case and painstakingly cites
a plethora of decisions at odds with Wilmot's conclusions.' 7 In discussing

the case,18 he draws the distinction between contempt committed in facie
and contempt committed out of the presence of the court. 19 Fox argues

that historical precedents would better justify summary procedure in direct
contempt cases than in indirect contempt proceedings. He cites several
early English cases of direct contempt in which the proceedings were in
the ordinary course of law, that is, by bill, information, indictment, or

presentment; 20 however, after the fifteenth century, Fox concludes that a
distinction was recognized between direct and indirect contempts 21 and that
the former was punished summarily. 22 Solly-Flood, an earlier writer, has
come to the following conclusion:

EN]o instance whatever has yet been found in any of those rolls or in the year14. THoMAs, op. cit. supra note 8, at 5.

15. Excerpt from Rex v. Almon, Wilmot's Notes 243, 254 (1765), quoted in Fox,
supranote 10, at 186.
16. ibid.
17. Fox, The King v. Almon, 24 L.Q. 1Ev. 266-68 (1908); Fox, The Summary
Process To Punish Contempt, 25 L.Q. REv. 238, 242-44 (1909). "There is certainly
ground for belief that in early times even contempts committed in facie by strangers
were punished, like other trespasses, only after trial in the ordinary course, and not by
summary committment." Fox, The Writ of Attachment, 40 L.Q. REv. 43, 57 (1924).
18. It must be kept in mind at this point that Wilmot's judgment was in reference
to a person accused of indirect, or constructive, contempt. His opinion, however, would
seem to apply to both constructive and direct contempts, summary proceedings being
applicable to both in order to keep a "blaze of glory" round the judge. "[Tihe Principle upon which Attachments issue for Libels upon Courts, is of a more enlarged and
important nature,-it is to keep a blaze of Glory around them, and to deter people
from attempting to render them contemptible in the eyes of the public." Wilmot's
Notes 243, 270 (1765), quoted in Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 8, at 1048. (Emphasis added.) Frankfurter and Landis query: "Can it be that 'the blaze of Glory' meet
for Tory judges of George III is to be kept forever burning by the Constitution of the
United States?" Id. at 1048.
19. Fox, The Writ of Attachment, 40 L.Q. REv. 43, 57 (1924).
20. See note 17 supra. Fox, however, says that at least some of these cases may be
explained by the fact that the phrase, "in the presence of the justice," was broadly
construed to mean "in the precinct of the court." Therefore, in many of these cases
the contempt "in the presence of the justice" quite probably was within the judge's
"constructive" presence, as opposed to his actual presence. Fox, The Summary ProcessTo Punish Contempt, 25 L.Q. 3Ev. 238, 244 (1909).
21. "By the reign of Henry VI a clear distinction was drawn between contempts
committed in Court and out of Court." Fox, supranote 19, at 57.
22. Fox, supra note 20, at 244.
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books of any committal in penam, by the Court of King's Bench in a summary
manner, and without indictment, presentment, information, or arraignment for
contempt, committed even in its presence, up to a considerable period after the
death [1413] of Henry IV.23
So it is apparent that summary punishment was not extant in England until
the fourteenth or fifteenth century. From this period on, punishment for
contempt in the presence of the court was dealt with summarily.

As for indirect contempt, the historical roots of summary proceedings are
not so deep. With the advent of the Star Chamber 24 and its corrupt prac-

tices, the use of summary proceedings
committed in the presence of the court
"indirect" acts as "seditious libel"26 were
great injustice. In addition, contempts

for contempts other than those
was begun.2. In this court such
punishable summarily, often with
of other courts were punishable

here.27 Though popular at first, the Star Chamber soon fell into general

disfavor and was abolished in 1641.28 But "the atmosphere of corrupt and

arbitrary practices which it had generated partly survived." 8 The common
law courts' procedure slowly became infused with the summary process,

culminating in that most famous of undelivered opinions, Rex v. Almon,

mentioned above.
B. United States
This decision has "bedevilled the law of contempt both in England and
in this country ever since."-3 Though no specific provision in the federal
23. Solly-Flood, The Story of Prince Henry of Monmouth and Chief-justice Gascoign,
47, 147-50 (1886). Speaking of the records of all the known cases of contempt which came before the King's
Bench, except for the Year-books, Solly-Flood states that "from the time of Magna
Charta to the death of Henry V. [1422], . . . not one [of these cases] was dealt with
otherwise than according to the course of the common law, i.e. by action, information,
presentment, or indictment." Id. at 147 n.1. (Emphasis added.) See at this same reference a chart of these contempt cases.
24. This court consisted of certain members of the King's Privy Council. It had
extensive civil and criminal jurisdiction and sat without the intervention of a jury.
Among its punishments were numbered imprisonment, fine, pillory, whipping, branding,
mutilation, torture, but never death.
25. For a general discussion of the relation of the Star Chamber to summary proceedings, see Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 8, at 1045-47; Fox, The King v. Almon,
24 L.Q. REv. 266, 271-78 (1908).
26. Seditious libel is defined briefly as the publication of any words or document
with a seditious intention; seditious intention is defined as "an intention to bring into
hatred or contempt, or to excite disaffection against the King [Queen] or the government and constitution of the United Kingdom ...." DcEY, TAE CoNsvrrbroN 243-44
(9th ed. 1956). Such conduct is clearly not within the presence of the court and is
exemplary of the expansion of the application of summary proceedings under this
court.
27. Fox, supra note 25, at 272. This was another significant extension of the scope
of conduct to which summary proceedings were applied.
28. Act for the Abolition of the Star Chamber, 16 Car. 2, c. 10.
29. Frankfurter & Landis, supranote 8, at 1045.
30. Id. at 1047.
3 TRANSACnIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SoC'y (n.s.)
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NOTE

constitution provides for summary proceedings in contempt cases, 31 the
colonies were generally inclined to follow Blackstone's statement of the
law.32 The earliest direct mention of the contempt power is found in the
Judiciary Act of 1789.

3

Under this act, the occasions for the exercise of

the power thus conferred were not defined.34 The discretion thereby left
in the federal judge was at times abused. In 1824 and 1825, one Luke Law-

less had prosecuted the claims of several hundred land claimants under
the Louisiana Purchase. After Judge James H. Peck rendered an opinion
fatal to the mass of unconfirmed claims, Lawless published in a newspaper
an ingenuously contrived "concise statement." This statement subjected
the court to contumely and promoted sympathy for the land claimants,
making fair and impartial juries unobtainable in the case. After four days
of heated argument with Lawless, Peck sentenced him to one day's imprisonment and suspended him from practice for eighteen months. Lawless immediately petitioned Congress for Peck's impeachment. The House
of Representatives brought articles of impeachment against Peck, and the
Senate, after a trial3 5 which consumed the greater part of the session of

1830-31, voted 22-21 against conviction.3 6 In order that this vote might not
be improperly construed as favoring Peck's action, Congress then passed
the Act of March 2, 1831. This statute permitted summary proceedings
only in cases of disobeyance of a writ of the court; misbehavior in the face

of the court, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice;
or the misbehavior by officers of the court in their official transactions.7
31. See Comment, 57 MIcir. L. REv. 258, 260-63 (1958).
32. See note 6 supra.
33. "And be it further enacted, that all the said courts of the United States shall
have power to . . . punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts,
all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same ....
".Actof
Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 83.
34. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 8, at 1024; Savin, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 267,
275-76 (1889).
35. At this impeachment proceeding the prosecution and defense combined to give
the most thorough and detailed exposition of the law, history and policy of contempt
proceedings ever made. "In the whole history of the subject there has never . . . been
a stronger case for punishment for a publication derogatory to the court than against
Lawless, or a better defence of punishment than Judge Peck's." Nelles & King, supra
note 8, at 547. For a full account and record of this proceeding, see STANSBuRY, RMPORT OF ThE TRAL OF JUDGE PEcK (1833). For law review treatment of the incident,

see Nelles & King, supra note 8, at 423-31; Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 8, at
1024, 1027. See also Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 45-48 (1941); THorns, op.
cit. supra note 8, at 25-27.
36. Thomas relates that Peck's acquittal despite the strong opposition to his act may
be explained by the judge's age and infirmities, the party and intra-party considerations
of the day, and the hostility between President Jackson and House Manager Buchanan.
THo mAs, op. cit. supra note 8, at 27.

37. "[T]he power of the several courts of the United States to issue attachments
and inflict summary punishments for contempts of court, shall not be construed to
extend to any cases except the misbehavior of any person or persons in the presence of
the said courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, the mis-
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This act therefore limited summary proceedings in criminal contempt cases
to acts of direct contempt, plus acts in disobeyance of the court's writ.
Subsequently, most of the states enacted their own statutes limiting the
summary power,38 generally in regard to out of court publications.
In 1918, in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States,39 the Supreme Court
construed the Act of 1831 to be merely declaratory of the common law
power to punish for contempt; 40 therefore a federal judge was not prohibited from summarily holding a newspaper in contempt for an out-ofcourt statement attacking his official integrity. Justice Holmes dissented on
the ground that such conduct did not call for a resort to summary proceedings.41 In this way was born a new means by which the federal courts
could sidestep legislation limiting their contempt power. Almost a quarter
of a century later the Supreme Court overruled the Toledo case in Nye v.
United States;42 there it was held that the statute of 1831 was intended to
43
limit the summary power of the federal courts in indirect contempt cases
and that this limitation was dependent upon the geographical,rather than
the causalproximity of the contemptuous conduct. 44 Parenthetically, it must
be kept in mind that the two cases were concerned with summary proceedings only as they were applicable to indirect contempts. The Court in both
cases apparently assumed that such proceedings were entirely proper in
cases of direct contempt. Summary proceedings in indirect contempt cases,
however, were severely limited.
III. FEDaiAL STATUTES ON CONTEMPT
In addition to the Act of 1831, several federal statutes have in varying
degrees concerned themselves with the problem of summary proceedings
in contempt cases.
The Clayton Act,4 5 passed in 1914, guarantees the right to a jury trial
behavior of any of the officers of the said courts, party, juror, witness, or any other
person or persons, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of the
said courts." Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, § 1, 4 Stat. 487.
38. "So deeply did the Peck case stir the country that State after State copied the

new Federal law." Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 8, at 1027.
39. 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
40. "[TIhe provision conferred no power not already granted and imposed no

limitations not already existing. In other words, it served but to plainly mark the
boundaries of the existing authority resulting from and controlled by the grants which
the Constitution made and the limitations which it imposed." Id. at 418.
41. Justice Holmes was not opposed to summary punishment per se. "I would go as
far as any man in favor of the sharpest and most summary enforcement of order in
Court and obedience to decrees, but when there is no need for immediate action contempts are like any other breach of law and should be dealt with as the law deals
with other illegal acts." Id. at 425-26.
42. 313 U.S. 33, 52 (1941).
43. Id. at 47-48.

44. Id. at 48.
45. Ch. 323, §§ 21, 22, 24, 38 Stat. 738, 739. These provisions of the Clayton Act

NOTE
upon demand where the contemptuous act is also a crime under any federal

or state law. The word "crime," meaning in this sense a common law or
statutory crime, must be distinguished from "criminal contempt." That is,

out of the broad expanse of criminal contempts, this statute carves out all
those acts which would be a crime in themselves and declares that for such
an act a jury trial may be obtained upon demand. This provision, however,
applies only to indirect contempts, excluding direct contempts and contempts committed in any action brought by the United States.
Analogously, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 6 passed in 1932, guarantees the
right to a jury trial for contempts involving injunctions in labor disputes.

Once again direct contempts are excluded.
One other pertinent statute is the Civil Rights Act of 1957.

7

By it, a

judge has the discretion to try without a jury any criminal contempt arising
now partly appear as 18 U.S.C. §§ 402, 3691 (1958). "§ 3691. jury trial of criminal
contempts. Wherever a contempt charged shall consist in wilful disobedience of any
lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of any district court of the United
States by doing or omitting any act or thing in violation thereof, and the act or thing
done or omitted also constitutes a criminal offense under any Act of Congress, or under
the laws of any state in which it was done or omitted, the accused, upon demand
therefor, shall be entitled to a trial by jury, which shall conform as near as may be
to the practice in other criminal cases. This section shall not apply to contempts committed in the presence of the court, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration
of justice, nor to contempts committed in disobedience of any lawful writ, process,
order, rule, decree, or command entered in any suit or action brought or prosecuted
in the name of, or on behalf of, the United States." These provisions were upheld in
Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42 (1924).
46. Ch. 90, § 11, 47 Stat. 72. This section is presently partly codified in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3692 (1958). "§ 3692. Jury trial for contempt in labor dispute cases. In all cases
of contempt arising under the laws of the United States governing the issuance of
injunctions or restraining orders in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the contempt shall have been committed. This section
shall not apply to contempts committed in the presence of the court or so near thereto
as to interfere directly with the administration of justice nor to the misbehavior, misconduct, or disobedience of any officer of the court in respect to the writs, orders or
process of the court." In United States v. United Mine Workers, 336 U.S. 258 (1946),
the Court held that this section was not intended by Congress to apply to disputes in
wlich the Government was an employer-litigant. See also Green v. United States,

356 U.S. 165 (1958).
47. 71 Stat. 638, 42 U.S.C. § 1995 (1958). "In all cases of criminal contempt arising
under the provisions of this Act, the accused upon conviction shall be punished by
fine or imprisonmdnt or both . . . Provided further, That in such proceeding for
criminal contempt, at the discretion of the judge, the accused shall be tried with or
without a jury: Provided further, however, That in the event such proceeding for
criminal contempt be tried before a judge without a jury and the sentence of the
court upon conviction is a fine in excess of the sum of $300 or imprisonment in excess
of forty-five days, the accused in said proceeding, upon demand therefor, shall be
entitled to a trial de novo before a jury, which shall conform as near as may be to the
practice in other criminal cases. This section shall not apply to contempts committed
in the presence of the court or so near thereto as to interfere directly with the administration of justice nor to the misbehavior, misconduct, or disobedience, of any officer of
the court in respect to writs, orders, or process of the court."
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under the act. However, if a judge so sitting fines a person a sum in excess
of $300 or imprisons him in excess of 45 days, the accused may demand a
trial de novo by jury. This statute, consistent with those mentioned above,
excludes 48from its provisions direct contempts and contempts committed
"so near" the court as to obstruct the administration of justice. Young in
years, the statute has been but rarely cited in the books. 49 It has been said,
however, that this statute applies only to "contempts growing out of civil
rights cases respecting the rightto vote."50
Also applicable here is Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.51 Rule 42(a) allows the judge to punish summarily any contempts
which he sees or hears and which are committed in the actual presence of
the court. Rule 42(b) provides that other criminal contempts (here the
term is no doubt used in the broad, generic sense) shall be prosecuted
"upon notice," and gives the defendant the right to jury trial in any case
"in which an act of Congress so provides." This rule is essentially a restatement of existing law;52 it does not confer upon district judges any power
greater than that which they possessed prior to March 21, 1946, 3 the date
of the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.54
IV. STATUS OF STATE LAw ON CONTE

-T

55

As mentioned above, the passage of the Act of 1831 signaled the dawn48. See Nelles & King, supra note 8, at 529-32, for a discussion of this particular
phrase.
49. For recognition of the existence of the statute, but no comment, see Comillion
v. Lightfoot, 270 F.2d 594, 607 (5th Cir. 1959) (dissent); Green v. United States,
356 U.S. 165, 187 n.19 (1958). See generally Murphy, The Contempt Power of the
Federal Courts, 18 FED. B.J. 34, 47-54 (1958).
50. Smith, Jury Trials in Contempt Cases, 20 GA. B.J. 297, 304 (1958). (Emphasis
added.)
51. "Criminal contempt (a) Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be
punished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting
the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. The order
of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered of record.
(b) Disposition Upon Notice and Hearing. [Other contempts require notice, hearing,
reasonable time to prepare defence, and the notice given must state the essential facts
with which the suspect is accused. Defendant is entitled to a trial by jury in any
case in which an act of Congress so provides.] . . . If the contempt charged involves
disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the
trial or hearing except with the defendant's consent."
52. "This rule is substantially a restatement of existing law, Ex parte Terry, 128
U.S. 289; Cooke v. United States, 45 S.Ct. 390, 267 U.S. 517, 534, 69 L.Ed 767."
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 18 U.S.C.A., rule 42 (1961). "Rule 42(a)
was not an innovation." Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 13 (1954).
53. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 13 (1954).
54. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure-Effective March 21, 1946, 327 U.S. 821
(1945). For a general discussion of all the statutes referred to above, see Smith, supra
note 50.
55. See note 38 supra.

NOTE
ing of a new era with respect to summary proceedings in contempt cases.

The pulse of the general public had been quickened by the publication
given the Peck impeachment proceedings; by 1860, 23 states had passed acts
limiting the power of the courts to try contempt cases summarily. 56 This
"honeymoon," however, was soon over. The case that set the new trend
and ended the era was State v. Morrill.57 This important decision construed
a typical statute of the day (similar to the Act of 1831) to be, at best, only
declaratory; furthermore, whatever the intention of the legislature, the court
58
could not be ousted of its summary power over contempt by publication.
The case had a tremendous influence on the budding liberalism of many
courts in regard to indirect contempt, especially contempt by publication.

Much of the ground that summary proceedings had lost in indirect contempt cases was recouped. One writer summarized the situation as follows:
The judiciary as a whole .. . has failed to recognize the necessity for reform, and
continues to apply the autocratic views set forth by Blackstone and Wilmot.
Consequently there have been frequent demands upon the legislatures of the
country for the passage of remedial legislation, and a number of statutes have been
passed as a result of this pressure. The judiciary, however, has in many instances
questioned the authority of the legislature to regulate, limit or define the power to
punish contempts of court, upon the theory that, because of the doctrine of the
separation of powers, the legislature cannot constitutionally interfere with the
power of a coordinate branch of the government.59

Despite the disfavor of the courts, the great majority of the states have
statutes regulating summary proceedings

in contempt cases. 60

Other

56. THorAs, PROBLEMS oF CoNTEMPT oF COURT 49 (1934).
57. 16 Ark. 384 (1855) (publication accused judge of taking a bribe).
58. The court based its holding on Blackstone, Rex v. Almon, and the "inherent"
right of courts to punish for such contempts. Stating that "the Legislature may regulate the exercise of, but cannot abridge the express or necessarily implied powers,
granted to this court by the [state] constitution," the court intimated that had the
legislature so intended, the act would have been unconsitutional. This theory has
found wide acceptance in other jurisdictions where the courts are faced with limiting
statutes. See TnomAs, op. cit. supra note 56.
59. Id. at 47. See Ford v. State, 69 Ark. 550, 64 S.W. 879 (1901) (legislature
exceeded its powers in passing a statute not specifically allowed by state constitution);
In re Fite, 11 Ga. App. 665, 76 S.E. 397 (1912) (as to courts created by state constitution, legislature cannot take away right to define contempt).
60. Alabama. Ar. CODE tit. 13, § 2 (1958). Definition of contempt is similar to
Arkansas statute infra. All contempts so defined are summarily punishable whether in
or out of court. Arizona. Amuz. REv. STAT. §§ 12-861 to -863, 13-341 (1956). One
who by committing a criminal offense also disobeys a court order, etc., must be given
notice and an opportunity to show cause; a jury trial is mandatory upon request.
"Criminal offense" is defined to include substantially the same contempts listed in the
Arkansas statute infra. Arkansas. ARx. CONST. art. 7, § 26. ARx. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-901,
-903 (1947). The Arkansas statute on criminal contempt is roughly similar to the
statutes of several other states, and is herein quoted in full as exemplary of them.
"Every court of record shall have power to punish, as for criminal contempt, persons
guilty of the following acts, and no others. First. Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent
behavior, committed during its sitting, in its immediate view and presence, and di-
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states' legislatures have ignored the problem, thereby retaining by implication the common law system. When compared these statutes exhibit a

myriad of differences. Some statutes expressly define contempt, excluding
all else. Some recognize the distinction between direct and indirect contempt; others do not. A few provide for summary proceedings in all cases
of contempt, whether direct or indirect; others limit summary proceedings
to direct contempt. A very few either forbid summary proceedings in
practically all cases or severely limit the punishment in such cases.
rectly tending to interrupt its proceedings, or to impair the respect due to its authority.
Second. Any breach of the peace, noise or disturbance, directly tending to interrupt its
proceedings. Third. Wilful disobedience of any process or order, lawfully issued or
made by it. Fourth. Resistance, wilfully offered, by any person, to the lawful order
or process of the court. Fifth. The contumacious and unlawful refusal of any person
to be sworn as a witness, and when so sworn, the like refusal to answer any legal and
proper interrogatory." "Contempts committed in the immediate view and presence of
the court, may be punished summarily; in other cases, the party charged shall be notifled of the accusation, and have a reasonable time to make his defense." California.
CAL. Civ. CODE ANN. §§ 1209, 1211-12 (Deering 1953). Contempt is defined similarly
to the Arkansas statute. Summary punishment may be levied for direct contempt. For
indirect contempt an affidavit of facts must be presented to the judge. Colorado. For
specific situations involving contempt of court, see the following sections of COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. (1953): § 12-1-17 (unlicensed attorneys); § 153-1-11 (refusal to
appear for deposition); § 80-9-7 (disobedience of subpoena by witness); § 78-2-12
(juror's failure to appear). Connecticut. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 51-33 (1949). "Any
court may punish by fine and imprisonment any person who in its presence behaves
contemptuously or in a disorderly manner." Contempts not committed in the presence of
the court are to be ascertained and punished according to the common law. Huntington
v. McMahon, 48 Conn. 174, 196 (1880). Delaware. DEL. SUPa. CT. (Caim.) R. 42.
"A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw
or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual
presence of the court .... [Any other] criminal contempt .. .shall be prosecuted on
notice. The notice shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time
for the preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts constituting the
criminal contempt charged and describe it as such." Any contempt other than direct
contempt which involves criticism or disrespect of a judge disqualifies that judge from
presiding at the trial in absence of defendant's consent. Florida. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
38.22-.23 (1943). Florida's statute is rather vague on its face. It defines contempt as
a refusal to obey "any legal order, mandate or decree, made or given by any judge
either in term time or in vacation relative to any of the business of said court, after
due notice thereof .... " However, it further provides that "nothing said or written,
or published, in vacation, to or of any judge, or of any decision made by a judge,
shall in any case be construed to be a contempt." State ex rel. Grebstein v. Lehman,
100 Fla. 481, 129 So. 818 (1930), provides that the court, upon commission of a
direct contempt, may act upon view and summarily inflict punishment. See Comment,
9 MI~aMI L.Q. 281, 282 (1955). Georgia. GA. CONST § 2-120. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-105
(1959). The Georgia statute is similar to the Arkansas statute supra. Hawaii. HAWAII
REv. LAws § 269-1 (1955). Every judicial tribunal may summarily punish persons
guilty of contempt, but punishment is limited to $100 and 10-60 days imprisonment,
Idaho. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 7-603, -604 (1948). Summary punishment is allowed if
the contempt is in the presence of the court. Otherwise, an attachment may issue upon
an order to show cause or notice. Illinois. For specific situations involving contempt
of court, see the following sections of ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd 1961): c. 13, § 1
(unlicensed attorneys); c. 110, § 101.19-12 (compelling obedience to discovery proceeding subpoena); c. 78, § 15 (juror's failure to appear); c. 38, § 735 (witness's

NOTE
Almost all of the above-mentioned statutes have been subjected to some
mitigating construction. Thomas, in his work on contempt, gives the following summary of the fate of these statutes:
failure to obey subpoena); c. 38, § 580(a) (witness's refusal to testify despite immunity from prosecution). Indiana. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 3-901, -907, -908 (Bums 1946).
Court may punish direct contempt summarily. Notice and opportunity to show cause
are required in indirect contempt proceedings. Iowa. IowA CODE ANN. §§ 665.2-.8
(1946). Iowa's statute is similar to Arkansas's. Unless the contempt is in the immediate view of the court, "or comes officially to its knowledge," an affidavit of the contemptuous transaction and a notice to show cause are required. Kansas. KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 20-120 (1949).
Only contempts committed in presence of the court
or in the judge's chambers may be punished summarily. All other contempts require
notice and hearing to show cause. Kentucky. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 432.230, .260
(1955). "A court shall not impose a fine of more than thirty dollars or imprison for
more than thirty hours for contempt without the intervention of a jury." Louisiana.
LA. CONST. art. 19, § 17. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:11, :12 (1951). "Every court
has the inherent power to . . . punish, as being a contempt, every interference with
or disobedience of its process or orders, as well as every act interrupting or tending to
interrupt its proceedings, or impairing the respect due to its authority." Maximum
punishment for contempt is a fine of $100 and/or ten days imprisonment. Maine. ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. c. 106, § 16, c. 147, § 1 (1954). "The superior court may . . .
punish for contempt ....
" "No person shall be held to answer in any court for an
alleged offense, unless on an indictment found by a grand jury, except for contempt
of court ...... Manland. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 4 (1957), art. 26, § 5 (Supp.
1960). Contempt is defined substantially the same as in Arkansas. Massachusetts. MAss.
ANN. LAws c. 275. §§ 5, 14 (1956). "Whoever, in the presence [of the court] . . .
makes an affray, or threatens to kill or beat another, or to commit any violence or outrage against the person or property of another, or contends with hot and angry words,
to the disturbance of the peace, may be ordered, without process or any other proof,
...to keep the peace ... for not more than three months [or] ... be committed ...."
to jail. Michigan. MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27.511-.513 (1938). Contempt is defined similarly to the Arkansas statute. Direct contempt may be summarily punished. Other acts of
contempt are punishable only after notice and a reasonable time to reply. Minnesota.
MINN.STAT. ANN. §§ 588.01-.04 (1947). Direct contempt (which consists of disorderly,
contemptuous, or insolent behavior toward the judge while holding court, or a breach
of the peace, boisterous conduct, or violent disturbance) is summarily punishable.
Other contempt proceedings require notice' and opportunity to show cause. Mississippi.
Miss. CODE ANN. § 1656 (1942). "The Supreme, circuit, chancery and county courts
shall have power to fine and imprison any person guilty of contempt of the court while
sitting ....
" But the punishment can not exceed $100 or thirty days imprisonment.
Missouri. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 476.110-.130 (Vernon 1952). Contempt is defined
similarly to the Arkansas statute. Contempt in presence of the court is punishable
summarily. Other contempts require an affidavit showing contemptous acts fo be presented to the court. Montana. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 93-9801, -9803 (1947).
Contempt is defined similarly to the Arkansas statute. Contempt in presence of court
is punishable summarily. Other contempts require an affidavit showing contemptous
acts to be presented to the court. Nebraska. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 25-2121, -2122 (1943).
Contempt is defined similarly to the Arkansas statute. Direct contempt is summarily
punishable. Other contempts require notice of accusation, reasonable time to make a
defence Nevada. NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 22.010, .030 (1957). Contempt is defined similarly to the Arkansas statute. Direct contempt is summarily punishable. In all other
eases an affidavit of facts is required. "In all cases of contempt arising without the
immediate view and presence of the court, the judge of such court in whose cohtempt
the defendant is alleged to be shall not preside at such trial over the objection of the
defendant." New Hampshire. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 547.11 (1955). New Jersey.
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(1) Statutes which mainly affect procedural matters (such as appeal,
necessity of a written verdict) are usually held to be in harmony with
the state constitution.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:10-1 (1952). Contempt consists of misbehavior in actual presence of the court, misbehavior of an officer of the court, disobedience by anyone of
the court's order. No statutory distinction between direct and constructive contempt.
New Mexico. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 16-1-2 (1953). Court may "preserve order and
decorum" by punishing for contempt, "being circumscribed by the usage of the courts
of the United States." New York. N.Y. JuDicIy LAW §§ 750, 751, 755. N.Y. PEN. LAW
§ 600. Contempt is defined similarly to the Arkansas statute. Direct contempt is summarily punishable. Other contempts require notice and reasonable time to make a
defence. North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 5-1, -5, -7 (1953). Statute is similar
to the Arkansas statute. Direct contempt is summarily punishable. Indirect contempt
requires an order to show cause. North Dakota. N.D. CODE ANN. §§ 27-10-01, -06, -07
(1960). Statute is similar to the Arkansas statute. Ohio. Omo R1EY. CODE. ANN. §§
7705.01, .02 (Baldwin 1960). Contempt is defined similarly to the Arkansas statute.
Oklahoma. OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 25. OILA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 565, 567 (1958).
Contempt is defined similarly to the Arkansas statute. Summary punishment may be
levied for direct contempt. In indirect contempt proceedings, the accused shall be
notified in writing of the accusation, have a reasonable time for defense, and, upon
demand, have a trial by jury. Oregon. ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 33.010, .030, .040 (1955).
Contempt is defined similarly to the Arkansas statute. Summary punishment may be
levied for direct contempt; indirect contempt proceedings require affidavit of facts,
opportunity to show cause. Pennsylvania. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2041-42 (1930).
Contempt is defined as follows: official misconduct of officer of court; disobedience
by officers, parties, jurors, and witnesses to lawful process of court; misbehavior of any
person in presence of court. Summary punishment may be levied for any of the above
contempts committed "in open court"; contempts committed in any other manner may
be punished by fine only. Rhode Island. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 8-6-1 (1956). "The
supreme and superior courts shall have power to .... punish, by fine or imprisonment,
or both, all contempts of their authority." South Carolina. S.C. CODE §§ 15-12, -13
(1952). Any person committing any misbehavior, "by word or gesture," in any court
of the state, may be fined a maximum of $50 and imprisoned until payment. For
striking or using violence in the presence of the court, the court has discretion as to
the amount of the fine. For any breach of peace "within the hearing . . . of the court,"
the court may direct the sheriff to bring the offenders before the court, and the court
"shall make such order thereon as may be consistent with law, justice and good order."
South Dakota. S.D. CODE §§ 33.3701-03 (Supp. 1960). Statute is similar to the Arkansas statute. Texas. TEX. CONST. art. 5, § 8. TE.x. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1911 (Vernon
1949).

"The district court may punish any person guilty of contempt .

. . ."

by a

fine not to exceed $100 and/or imprisonment not to exceed three days. Utah. UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 12. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-32-1, -3, -4 (1953). Statute is similar
to the Arkansas statute. For indirect contempts, the accused has a right to notice,
hearing and counsel. Vermont. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 122, 123 (1959). Court may
enter contempt proceedings when a party violates a lawful order of the court. Virginia.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-292 (1950). Washington. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 7.20.010, .030, .040
(1961). Statute is similar to Arkansas statute. West Virginia. W. VA. CODE ANN. §
6024 (1955). Summary punishment may be given only for certain types of direct
contempt, plus disobeyance of a court order. The court may impanel a jury to determine the amount of punishment (either by fine or imprisonment); in absence of jury,
the amount of punishment the judge can levy is limited. Wisconsin. Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 256.03, .04 (1957). Statute is similar to the Arkansas statute. Wyoming. Wyo.
STAT. ANN.§§ 1-668, -670 (1957).
For a list of leading cases on contempt from each state see Annot., Contempt of
Court, 75 L. Ed. 185 (1930).
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(2) Likewise constitutional are statutes which fix maximum penalties either by fine or imprisonment (provided sufficient punishment is
left to make the contempt power effective).
(3) Statutes attempting to meet the demand for jury trial for indirect or constructive contempts are, for the most part, unconstitutional.
(4) Statutes which exhaustively enumerate the contempts punishable have been rendered ineffective by the courts' liberal construction.
(5) Statutes which enumerate certain acts as contempts and declare
that no other acts shall constitute contempt have been declared unconstitutional. 61
Interestingly enough, all contempt statutes on the books today fall, at
which Thomas
least in part, under one or the other of the classifications
62
declared generally to have been found constitutional.
In the state statutes of the present day a few similarities stand in contrast to the background of dissimilarities. Many statutes recognize a di tinction between direct and indirect criminal contempt. Furthermore,
most of these statutes provide for summary proceedings in cases of direct
contempt and for notice, hearing and sufficient time to prepare a defence
in indirect contempt proceedings. A slightly smaller number of states
expressly define certain acts as contempt, and the Arkansas statute gives a
63
So it
fair representation of the acts defined as contempt in most states.
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V. TENNEssEE LAw ON CONTEMPT
The Tennessee statute, 64 with one exception,6 5 is similar to a plurality of
other states' statutes. As is true in most states, the Tennessee courts have
61. THomAS, op. cit. supra note 56, at 50-52.

62. See note 60 supra.
63. Ibid.
64. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-902 (1956).

"The power of the several courts to issue

attachments, and inflict punishments for contempts of court, shall not be construed

to

extend to any except the following cases: (1) The wilful misbehavior of any person in
the presence of the court, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice.
(2) The wilful misbehavior of any of the officers of said courts, in their official trans-

actions. (3) The wilful disobedience or resistance of any officer of the said courts,
party, juror, witness, or any other person, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule,
decree, or command of said courts. (4) Abuse of, or unlawful interference with, the
process or 'proceedings of the court. (5) Wilfully conversing with jurors in relation
to the merits of the cause in the trial of which they are engaged, or otherwise tampering with' them. (6) Any other act or ommission declared a contempt by law."
65. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-902(6) (1956), supra note 64, is not found in most of
the other state statutes.
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dug a moat of judicial construction around the statute; the case law therefore is of primary importance. In State v. Galloway,66 the Tennessee Supreme Court laid the foundation for case law on contempt. The court
there held that the inferior courts could punish as contempt only that
conduct set forth in the first five subsections of the act. 67 Furthermore,
the court determined that subsection (6) ("Any other act or ommission
declared a contempt by law") did not include any acts other than those
specifically listed in the statute.6 This construction was reaffirmed in In re
Hickey.69 In addition, the Galloway case set forth the rule that the court
should and would give the statute a "liberal application to the cases which
may arise in the exigencies of the Courts."70 The Hickey case set forth
the basic rule that publications charging that a judge is unfit or incapacitated to hold court is not a contempt under subsection (1) of the statute.71
This subsection refers only to direct contempts committed in the presence
of the court or "so near thereto as to amount to the same thing."72 This
holding, made in 1923, is anticipatory of the decision of the Supreme Court
in Nye v. United States.73
The scope of summary procedure in contempt cases in Tennessee was
raised in State ex rel. May v. Krichbaum 4 and Pass v. State.75 In Krichbaum a city court judge was charged with being mercernarily motivated in
the conduct of his cases; this charge was made directly to the judge in an
interim period between cases. Such an act constituted contempt, said the
court; in addition, since the offense was committed in the face of the court,
it could "proceed upon its own knowledge of the facts, and punish the
offender without further proof, and without issue or trial in any form."' 6
The Pass case, decided in 1944, would seem to extend this power of the
77
court, though to what degree is not clear.
66. 45 Tenn. 326 (1868).
67. Id. at 329.

68. ibid.
69. 149 Tenn. 344, 373, 258 S.W. 417, 425 (1923). "Subsection 6 adds nothing
to the other five subsections nor does it make the common law with respect to contempt
applicable."
70. 45 Tenn. at 339.
71. 149 Tenn. at 374-80, 258 S.W. at 425-27.
72. Id. at 374, 258 S.W. at 425.
73. 313 U.S. 33, 52 (1941).
74. 152 Tenn. 416, 278 S.W. 54 (1925).
75. 181 Tenn. 613, 184 S.W.2d 1 (1944).
76. 152 Tenn. at 423, 278 S.W. at 55.
77. See 181 Tenn. at 616-18, 184 S.W.2d at 2-3. The difficulty with this case is
that it consists mostly of quotations from other sources. One wonders therefore
whether the court meant to adopt all the statements made in the quotations, some of
which are rather extreme.
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VI. REASONS GIVEN FOR SuimmRY PROCE NGS
IN Dm='c Co TiTr CASES
At least from the time of Wilmot the courts of both England and the
United States have staunchly underpinned the proposition that the contempt power of the courts is coeval with the founding of the courts; such
power is indispensable to the proper functioning of the courts, particularly
in direct contempt cases. Several different reasons for this view have been
given. Perhaps the oldest is that without this power the courts "would be
contemptible."7 8
One writer has stated another reason as follows: "[T]he truth, stripped
of metaphysical buncombe as to inherence, is simply that summary power
as to various contempts is expedient ......
9 This hits closer to the truth
than the "contemptible" argument, for whatever the validity of the latter,
it is obvious that summary proceedings do move with greater speed than

the ofttimes infuriatingly slow orthodox procedure. This statement, however, is only descriptive of one characteristic of summary proceedings, and

the question still must be proposed: Wy is expedience necessary?
Some have said that contemptuous acts must be punished instantly, and
that in most cases this must be done by the judge himself.8 0 "The danger
of harshness on the part of the judge is a less evil than the danger of a
complete suppression of the functions of justice by permitting an uproar to
continue unchecked."8' This reason-facilitating the smooth flow of the
trial-seems to have merit.
An additional reason advanced for this extraordinary proceeding is that
further disturbances in the case before the court are discouraged.82 The
quick removal of an agitator from the courtroom will have a sobering effect
on the remaining spectators, as well as the parties, witnesses, attorneys, and
jurors. Analogously, "misconduct in other cases is deterred by knowledge
of the judge's great power."8 3 That is, the quick commitment of a con-

temnor in a prior case would have a greater deterrent effect than other
methods on persons contemplating such conduct in later cases.
An oft-repeated reason is the promotion of the dignity of the court; this
is a corollary to the "contemptible" argument mentioned above. It is
nothing more than what Wilmot had in mind when he spoke of the "blaze
of glory '8 4 which should be kept shining round the court. In keeping with

this reason-that the courts have need of the summary contempt power in
78. Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 DalI.) 318, 329 (1788).
79. Nelles & King, Contempt by Publicationin the United States, 28 COLuM. L. REv.

524, 548 (1928).
80.
81.
82.
83.

Beale, Contempt of Court, Criminaland Civil, 21 HAv. L,
Ibid.
See Note, 2 STAN. L.R. 763, 766 (1950).
Id. at 766-67. (Emphasis added.)

84. See note 18 supra.

REv.

161, 172 (1908).
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order to keep and hold the respect of the public-the courts have extended
the use of summary contempt proceedings even to indirect contempt. One
further reason why the courts have stood by summary proceedings for so
long-a reason never mentioned in the opinions-is what Thomas calls the
"natural inclination of men to extend their power."8 "[J]udges, being
human, are subject to anger like other men,"86 and when this anger is upon
them, they like other men desire no limit to their power.
Such an unusual proceeding, dangerously lacking in the processes which
have militated against arbitrary trials, has at times produced miscarriages
of justice. Two examples will suffice as illustrative of the dangers.
In Fleming v. United States,8 7 the court of appeals upheld a commitment
for direct contempt by defendant. Defendant, in asking for a change of
venue, presented to the court an affidavit charging that the lower court
judge was biased, had connived with plaintiff in bringing the action, was
interested in the outcome of the litigation, and had had the charge pressed
so as to hide his (the judge's) responsibility for the crime of embezzlement.
The upper court, in a statement which treats rather lightly the defendant's
right to a fair trial, said:
But the defendant contends that the proceeding lacked due process of law In
that no proof was taken of the untruth of the charges contained in his affidavit.
In order to punish the defendant's contempt it was not necessary to take the
testimony of witnesses to show that the chargesmade by the defendant were untrue.
The punishment was lawfully imposed in the exercise of the court's power to
preserve its dignity and decorum in the administrationof justice.88

The question might be posed: Just what could the defendant do, assuming
these facts to be true? If he does nothing except defend on the merits, he
will be at a tremendous disadvantage and will surely lose his case. If he
tries to obtain a change of venue so as to have a fair trial, he cannot show
his real reasons for asking for such a change. Should he try the case, lose,
and attempt to get a reversal at the appellate level, carrying the burden
that the losing party always has? In the court's statement as to its power
to maintain its "dignity and decorum" we see the ghosts of Wilmot and
the Star Chamber approvingly contemplating a hapless defendant flaming
brightly in the court's "blaze of glory."
In Fisher v. Pace,89 the Supreme Court of the United States upheld by a
single vote the committal of a Texas lawyer for contempt. The anger and
bias of the judge are clearly shown from the record,9 but the Court re85. THomAs, op. cit. supra note 56, at 8.
86. Beale, supra note 80, at 172.
87. 279 Fed. 613 (9th Cir. 1922).
88. Id. at 615. (Emphasis added.)
89. 336 U.S. 155 (1949) (Reed, J.).
90. The following is a short excerpt from the lower court record which gives some
indication as to the degree of the judge's "hair trigger" temper:
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fused to overturn the case on the theory that the conduct of the attorney
was sufficient to allow the court to so use its power.91 The majority admits
that the judge's language was "mildly provocative,"92 but feels that the
contemnor's conduct was worse. But should a judge be allowed to be even
"mildly provocative"? Justice Douglas, in his dissent, answers in the
negative: "This lawyer was the victim of the pique and hotheadedness of
a judicial officer who is supposed to have a serenity that keeps him above
the battle and crowd."9 3 Here is a situation where both parties were no

doubt in the wrong, and yet the attorney alone was punished, that punishment being levied by his provoker.
VII. Tim CoNsTrnuoN

AND SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS
IN DIRECT CONEMPT CASES

Though these two situations are by no means typical of all contempt
cases, it is obvious that dangers abound here. What then is the position
and status of summary proceedings (especially as to direct contempt) in
light of the Constitution? The Supreme Court has said:
[T]he power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to the
due administration of justice. The moment the courts of the United States were
called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they -became
possessed of this power.9 4

In trying a contempt committed in facie, the federal courts have power to
inflict immediate punishment, without trial, notice, explanation of contemnor's motives, or jury. This type of procedure is not a violation of due
process, and the contemnor has no constitutional right to trial by jury:
This [summary proceedings, at least in direct contempt cases], then, is due process
of law in regard to contempts of courts; was due process of law at the time the
Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution was adopted; and nothing has
ever changed it except such statutes as Congress may have enacted for the courts
of the United States, and as each State may have enacted for the government of
95
its own courts.
"By the Court: I will declare a mistrial if you mess with me two minutes and a
half, and fine you besides.
"By Mr. Fisher: That is all right. We take exception to the conduct of the Court.
"By the Court: That is all right; I will fine you $25.00." 336 U.S. at 166.
91. Id. at 160-61.
92. "We cannot say, however, that mildly provocative language from the bench
puts a constitutional protection around an attorney so as to allow him to show the
contempt for judge and court manifested by this record ..... Id. at 163.
93. Id. at 166.
94. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873).
95. Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134 U.S. 31, 38 (1890).
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Thus we see that, as to direct contempts, the Supreme Court has proclaimed summary proceedings to be fully constitutional in all their ramifications.96
VIII. RBjUa omS oF SUMMARY PROcEDuRE IN DiRECT CONTEMPT CASES
Throughout this paper it may be noted that the general inclination of
the courts is to favor and support the use of summary proceedings in direct
contempt cases. A few dissents, scattered but strong, have been raised to
this proposition. As was shown, the research of both Solly-Flood and Fox
has revealed that there was once a time, though long past, when the judges
wielded not the summary power, even as to in facie contempts.9 7 One
wonders what those ancient judges would have said if told that their system of jurisprudence would break down without the summary power.
Less remote to us in time is the work of Edward Livingston, who has
been called "a truly great lawyer" by eminent modem authorities. 8 One
of the first true liberals, Livingston set forth his ideas on contempt in his
proposed penal code of Louisiana.9 9 This code provided that if anyone
wilfully made a clamor or noise in court which obstructed the proceedings
of such court, or refused to obey an order of the court made for the
promotion of decorum and order, the judge might cause the sheriff to remove the offender from the building. If the offender repeatedly returned
and disturbed the court, the judge was empowered to imprison the disturber for the rest of the court session during that day, and such party
would be charged with a misdemeanor, triable by jury. As to the use of
any indecorous, contemptuous, or insulting expressions to the court, with
intent to insult the court, Livingston said that such acts should also be made
a misdemeanor, with the intent of the defendant and the impropriety of
his statements to be determined by a jury. For violence or threats of
violence to the court or persons involved in the litigation, Livingston proposed that these offenses should be "tried by indictment, or information in
the usual form." Livingston's basic premise was that the need for the
summary contempt power for in facie acts, universally used by the courts
in defending their power, was no longer imperative:
96. As to indirect contempts, the courts may be limited in their powers by (1)
statutes, see notes 45-54 supra and accompanying text; (2) due process, Cooke v.
United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925); (3) freedom of speech and press, Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Note, 23 ALBANY L. REv. 61 (1959).

See generally

Note, 10 VAND. L. REv. 831 (1957).
97. See notes 20-23 supra.
98. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 52, at 1044 n.118. "He was a very learned
man and deeply rooted in the common law." Ibid. Livingston defended Andrew Jackson in the latter's famous contempt trial. See Deutsch, The United States Versus Andrew Jackson, 46 A.B.A.J. 966 (1960).
99. Frankfurter & Landis, supranote 98.

NOTE
In the present improved state of the human intellect, people do not so readily
submit to the force of this word (necessity) as they formerly did. They inquire-

they investigate-and in more instances than one, the result has been, that
attributes heretofore deemed necessary for the exercise of legal power, were found
to be only engines of its abuse. Not one of the oppressive prerogatives of which

the crown has been successively stripped, in England, but was in its day defended
on the plea of necessity.lO0

To Livingston, the power to remove the offender from the court was sufficient for the protection of the court; the power to punish, he felt, was
not indispensable to the judge and should be left to the state after trial
by jury.
Still later, in the period between State v. Morrill'0 and Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States,10 2 the Supreme Court of New Jersey boldly
asserted that the power to commit summarily persons who, by disorderly
conduct, interferred with the business of the court was not necessarily an
incident of a court of justice. Speaking in general of the minor state
courts, the court had the following to say:
In the present case, the justice might have caused the plaintiff to be removed from
his court-room. He might have required of him bail for his appearance at court

to answer to a criminal charge, and as security for good behavior. He might have
committed the plaintiff into custody until the cause on trial was concluded, before
he gave him a hearing; and if the plaintiff refused or was unable to give bail, he
might have committed him to jail in default of bail.
These powers, which are inherent in the judicial office, in the exercise of official

duties, are amply sufficient to secure order and decorum in these courts, and to
vindicate their authority.1O3

This case is the only one found which bridges the long gap from Livingston to the twentieth century. In this century, several state court judges
have opposed summary proceedings in direct contempt cases. In State v.
Buddress,104 the Washington Supreme Court in a 3-2 decision held that a
lower court had the power to try a contemnor summarily for contempt.
No better example of direct contempt may be found, as the accused was
cited for using "boisterous, angry, insulting, vicious language," followed
by a fistfight in the presence of the court. The remarkable aspect of this
case is that if one judge of the majority had switched his position to the
side of the minority, there would have been at least one state which denied
summary proceedings in direct contempt cases. Although this point seems
at first sight rather insignificant, the continued functioning of the Washington courts without the summary power would have gone far toward belying
100. EDWAmD LIviNGsToN, Comn',L=r

WoRKs 264 (1873), quoted in Nelles & King,

supra note 79, at 419 n.102.
101. 16 Ark. 384 (1855).
102. 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
103. Rhinehart v. Lance, 43 N.J.L. 311, 320 (Sup. Ct. 1881).
104. 63 Wash. 26, 114 Pac. 879 (1911).
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the "necessity," "expedience," and "order and dignity of the courts" arguments. The short dissent of the minority is worthy of quotation.
Notwithstanding the forceful argument made by [the majority] and the pertinency of the cases cited ifi the opinion, I am unable to divest my mind of the
idea that in the interest of liberty and in harmony with the genius of our government every citizen should have a right at some time and in some place to defend
himself against a charge of crime, a conviction of which works a deprivation of
his liberty or his property rights. The inconveniences suggested in the majority
opinion may arise, but the considerations I have mentioned are paramount. I am
therefore compelled to dissent. 105

Other more powerful and respected voices have found reason to question
such proceedings. Rumblings have been heard from the Supreme Court of
the United States, casting doubt on the constitutionality of summary proceedings in direct contempt cases. The interesting dissents of Justices Black
and Douglas in Sacher v. United States,10 6 Isserman v. Ethics Committee'0 7
and Offutt v. United States0 8 appear to breach, at the highest judicial
level, the almost universal wall of approval of summary proceedings in
direct contempt cases. In the Sacher case 09 Black based his dissent on
three premises: (1) Trial judge Medina was shown to be biased against
the defendants from the record." 0 (2) The determination of defendant's
guilt, summarily and without notice, hearing, or opportunity to defend,
was in violation of due process of law: "Before sentence and conviction
these petitioners were accorded no chance at all to defend themselves.
They were not even afforded an opportunity to challenge the sufficiency or
the accuracy of the charges. Their sentences were read to them but the
fall charges were not. I cannot reconcile this summary blasting of legal
careers with a fair system of justice."1 Black also points out that this
unfairness at the trial level was carried to the appellate level; the 13,000
pages of evidence forced the appellate courts to examine only the excerpts
which the trial judge had incorporated into his charges. Furthermore, in
using the record of the client's case in determining the lawyer's guilt the
appellate courts are apt to judge the lawyer according to the merits of
the client's case--"guilt by association." This tendency is especially dangerous in situations where the client's case is highly unpopular or un105. 114 Pac. at 883. (Emphasis added.)
106. 343 U.S. 1, 14-23 (1952). See generally Edises, Contempt of Court and the
Lawyer: The Unequal Combat, 18 LAw. Gun.r REv. 49 (1958); 6 VAND. L. REV. 120

(1952).
107. 345 U.S. 927 (1953).
108. 348 U.S. 11 (1954), 8 VAND. L. REv. 643 (1955).
109. This case involved an appeal from the contempt commitment of one of the
lawyers for the eleven Communist defendants in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494

(1951).
110. This premise is outside the pale of this note except as buttressing for the
proposition that summary proceedings should not obtain even in direct contempt cases.
111. 343 U.S. at 18. (Emphasis added.)
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orthodox, as here. (3) The defendants were denied their right to a jury
trial. Citing article III, section 2 of the Constitution ("The Trial of all
Crimes ...shall be by Jury"), and the fifth amendment ("No person shall
be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime unless on
presentment and indictment of a Grand Jury.. . ."), Black argues for jury
trial. Although making the reservation that in some instances summary
proceedings might be necessary, Black states that the defendants should
not be conclusively presumed guilty on the theory that the judge's observation and inferences are always infallible. This view, it is submitted, might
be extended to all contempts.
In the Isserman case a federal district court judge had summarily committed an attorney for contempt. The findings of the judge were used by
the ethics committee in permanently disbarring the attorney from practice
of law in that state. Black, joined by Douglas, states in a short memorandum decision that the petitioner was denied due process of law under the
fourteenth amendment. This is an extension of Black and Douglas' views
to state court proceedings. The opinion apparently tacitly assumes that
jury trials are not compelled by the Constitution in state court contempt
proceedings; rather, the holding is grounded solely on the fact that the
attorney was denied an opportunity to confront witnesses against him and
to deny, explain, or extenuate the charges against him.
In the Offutt case the judge had engaged in a heated argument with the
contemnor. The majority of the court remanded the case to the lower court,
with the provision that a different judge sit in the contempt proceeding.
Black and Douglas, in a seven line concurring opinion agree in part with
the majority; they argue, however, that petitioner should be accorded a
112
jury trial on the basis of the reasons in the Sacher and Isserman cases.
The most pertinent and argumentative proposals as to the propriety of
summary proceedings for direct contempts are to be found in Judge
Cameron's concurring opinion in Ballantyne v. United States.13 The contemnor had refused to answer a question propounded to him by a grand
jury; having been brought before the federal district court and having
refused a second time to answer the question, he was convicted of contempt
of court. On appeal, the conviction was reversed. The majority based
their reversal on the fact that a truthful answer to the judge's question
might have been incriminating to the defendant. Cameron concurs with
the majority that the case should be reversed, but takes issue with the
majority's intimation that the contemnor was not entitled to a jury trial.
"It is abhorrent to Anglo-Saxon justice as applied in this country that one
man, however lofty his station or venerated his vestments, should have the
power of taking another man's liberty from him."114 Granted, he argues,
112. 348 U.S. at 18.
113. 237 F.2d 657, 666-70 (5th Cir. 1956).
114. Id. at 667.
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that contempt has been traditionally dealt with summarily; nevertheless,
such proceedings are gradually being curbed. Cameron cites several Su'preme Court cases which he feels evince both a general intention of the
Court to treat with wariness the use of the contempt power and a desire
to limit it wherever possible." 5 He also cites the Constitution, the Clayton
Act, the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as being indicative of his arguments. Finally, he sums up the
feelings of several commentators in this field by saying:
It transcends recognized frailties of human nature to suppose that a judge can be
free from the inclinations arising from natural pique which would be engendered
by a direct refusal by the accused to obey an order freshly made by him, and the
temptation to strike back which inevitably accompanies ruffled pride.11 6
IX. CONCLUSION

The courts are prone to avow their belief in the sanctity and indispensability of summary procedure in direct contempt cases (all that is said here
as to direct contempt would apply a fortiori to indirect contempts). As the
-functioning institution most directly concerned with the administration of
justice, they are entitled to great deference. But, as Livingston said, the
argument of "necessity" has sustained even the most arbitrary practices in
the past." 7 Possibly, therefore, a study is in order on the actual need for
summary procedure in contempt cases.118 If no need can be shown to
counterbalance the dangers inherent in such a procedure, it would seem
that it should be abolished. Since only a scientific examination of the
problem could show the actual need, and since the courts have frequently
set forth their own reasons for supporting such procedure, the following
statements will be devoted to a discussion of the arguments against
summary proceedings in direct contempt cases.
The argument most often voiced against this type of proceeding is that
it opens wide the door for the expression of the court's bias, anger, or
impatience. This door is never completely closed in any judicial proceeding
where a man sits in judgment of other men.11 9
115. Id. at 668 n.22.
116. Id. at 669.
117. See notes 98-99 supra and accompanying text.
118. Will the judges take it upon themselves to make such a study? In an analogous
situation, Thomas points out that "the judiciary have been so well pleased with their
summary powers that they seem never to have undertaken a searching investigation
into the history of the contempt power." THOMAS, PROBLEMS OF CONTLNILaT OF COURT

65 (1934).

119. How often, one wonders, have the judges mixed the vindication of the authority

of the court with the vindication of their own personal feelings, conduct decried centuries ago by Jehosophat who warned his judges: "Take heed what ye do: for ye
judge not for man, but for the Lord [the State], who is with you in the judgment."
2 Chronicles 19:6.
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The judge who manages to keep most of his personal feelings out of his
decisions may be victimized by another less obvious flaw of the summary
procedure: the fact that the judge, striving for impartiality and fearful of
his own prejudice, may be unnecessarily lenient with the contemnor. This
then is a paradox-the very proceedings which were established for the
promotion of the dignity of the courts may subject the guilty to less punishment than a more orthodox procedure.
A third argument is grounded on the ability of some courts to function
without the use of the summary power. The most common example is the
justice of the peace. In many states this minor judicial officer is forbidden
to imprison and fine a contemnor; he can only remove the contemnor from
court, or extract from him a bond to insure his cooperation. In addition; as
mentioned, the courts of England had little or no summary power prior to
the fifteenth century-but managed to survive. 120 Analogously, Congress
has limited itself by prohibiting the use of the summary power in its investigatory functions. United States Code title 2, sections 192 and 194 provide that all prosecutions for certain contempts of Congress must be by
indictment or information, and trial must be under the usual safeguards of
ordinary criminal procedure.
At this point some objection should be raised to the contention that normal criminal proceedings would be less effective than summary procedure.
It is often argued that if the jury were to try contempts, it might fail to
vindicate the authority of the court because of prejudice against the judge
and for the underdog contemnor. But is the judge any less likely to be
biased than the jury, especially as to conduct which almost always constitutes a personal affornt? Furthermore, as Holmes said, "Universal distrust creates universal incompetence." 121 If the courts are to be presumed
to be fair and just,m why should not the jury?mm If the jury is not to be
trusted, then it should be thrown down from its high place in our system
of jurisprudence. If it is to be trusted, what better function could it have
than to act as an impartial, truth-seeking buffer between judge and contemnor?
Quite properly it may be asked: What are the alternatives to summary
proceedings? Several answers present themselves. For the purpose of
facilitating the progress of a trial, the contemnor might be removed bodily
from the courtroom. If this failed to deter him, a peace bond might be
120. See notes 20-23 supra.

121. Graham v. United States, 231 U.S. 474,480 (1913).
122. "[Doubts .. .should be resolved in favor of the competence of the District
Courts .... " Sullivan v. Behimer, 363 U.S. 351, 369 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
123. "In the courts of the United States the judge and jury are assumed to be
competent to play the parts that always have belonged to them in the country in
which the modem jury trial had its birth." Graham v. United States, supra note 121,
at 480 (Holmes, J.).
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levied; in the last resort, the contemnor might be imprisoned until the end
of the trial. As for problems of future deterrence and vindication of the
authority of the courts, these might be solved by regular criminal proceedings with notice, counsel and jury. After all, this has been the traditional,
and successful, method by which the authority of the State has been vindicated as to the more ordinary crimes.
Is there a "trend"12 4 toward doing away with summary proceedings in
direct contempt cases? Possibly so, though as yet it has gained little
momentum. The ideas of Livingston, the brief smattering of state court
cases, the Act of 1831 which through Nye v. United States restricted summary proceedings for contempt by publication in federal court cases, the
Clayton Act which allows jury trials where the contemptuous act is a true
crime, the Norris-LaGuardia Act and Civil Rights Act of 1957 which provide
for jury trials in certain specific instances, the procedure used for contempt
of Congress, the dissents of Black, Douglas and Cameron,-all these are
indicative of some sort of movement toward extending the scope of jury
trials in direct contempt cases. What this movement means, and where it
is leading is unfathomable at present-only time will tell.
TuoMAs R. ALLEN
124. See generally Comment, Recent Trends Curtailing the Summary Contempt
Power in Federal Courts, 8 HASTINGs L.J. 56 (1956). In a fairly recent case, Cammer
v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 404 (1956) (Black, J.), the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the statement made in the Toledo case that the contempt power should be limited to
"the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.",

